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ARE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS
PRECLUDED IN NEBRASKA WHERE PRIOR
PAYMENTS WERE RECEIVED UNDER
ANOTHER STATE'S ACT?
Ronald L. Sluyter*
I. INTRODUCTION
The question whether an employee is precluded from bringing
a workmen's compensation action in one state, because he has
previously received payments under another state's statute arises
where an injury or an employment relationship has ties with two
or more states. This is a common problem because of existing dif-
ferences in the various state compensation acts, and it is intensified
because of increasing multi-state business activities.1 The problem
most frequently presented to the courts is whether the forum state
will award second payments under its act when it authorizes a
greater amount of compensation than the first state. Other facets
of the problem have also been presented to the courts. For example,
what happens when the employee has been denied compensation
in the prior state;2 or when statutory differences exist relating to
the employee's rights to bring actions outside the compensation
act?3 The current importance of the question of applicability of
Nebraska's act after prior payments have been received is pointed
up by the following facts. The effect of receiving prior payments
* B.S., 1960, LL.B., 1962, University of Nebraska; Member of Nebraska
State Bar Ass'n; Presently employed by Swenson, Erickson & Westering,
Omaha, Nebr.
1 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 84.10 (1952).
2 La Rue v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 57 N.M. 93, 254 P.2d 1059 (1953);
see 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 365, n. 23 (1952).
3 The constitution may allow the forum state to grant an employee supple-
mental recovery outside its compensation act though the employee has
recovered compensation payments under another state's act. Carroll
v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). Generally, however, the courts do not
allow such recovery. The situation is distinguished from the supple-
mental compensation award because of different choice of law rules.
Generally, in the common-law tort action, the local law of the place of
injury is applied. Thus, if the local law of the state of injury does not
create a cause of action, the forum court will generally not allow the
action although authorized by its compensation act. Johnson v. Catlett,
246 N.C. 341, 98 S.E.2d 458 (1957); Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather, 210
F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Tucker v. Texas Co., 203 F.2d 918 (5th Cir.
1953); Willingham v. Eastern Airlines, 199 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952);
McLendon v. Kissik, 363 Mo. 264, 250 S.W.2d 489 (1952).
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under another state's act is not specifically provided for in Ne-
braska's act. Nor has the effect of receiving prior payments been
decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court. The decisions of other
courts are, to some extent, in conflict; and the practice of the Ne-
braska Workmen's Compensation Court is contrary to the result
of recent cases decided by other state courts.
II. CONFLICTS OF LAW AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Several differences exist in the area of workmen's compensa-
tion as compared to other types of personal injury actions. These
differences exist in the choice of law rules as well as full faith
and credit rules applicable to statutes and awards. In a common
law personal injury action, the forum court often applies the local
substantive law of some other state.4 On the other hand, workmen's
compensation acts usually grant the forum court jurisdiction to
apply the provisions of its local statute.5 In certain areas of the
law, where states have created statutory rights of action, the United
States Supreme Court has required other states to recognize and
enforce the rights created by the foreign state's statute.6 In the area
of workmen's compensation, however, two states may have con-
current jurisdiction to apply the provisions of their local statutes
without denying full faith and credit to the acts of other states
which may also have jurisdiction to compensate for the injury.7
4 For example, in common-law tort cases the general rule is that the local
law of the place of injury controls creation of liability. RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92 (1949).
5 E.g., The Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court "shall have authority
to administer and enforce all of the provisions of the Nebraska Work-
men's Compensation Act." NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-152 (Reissue 1960).
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note 485 (1934); Note,
11 MINN. L. REV. 329 (1927).
6 See, e.g., wrongful death acts. See first Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. United
Air Lines, 343 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
7 There are two distinct problems here. First, certain limitations are im-
posed by the federal constitution; and second, the self-imposed state
limitations on jurisdiction within those constitutional limits. Constitu-
tional problems include both due process and full faith and credit ques-
tions. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532 (1935); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
The problems and cases are discussed in the following: GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 100 (1949); Notes, 34 ILL. L. REV. 226 (1939),
39 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1939). See also Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947). On the limits of state self-imposed jurisdic-
tional requirements see 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 87.00-.15; id.
at 520; Annot., 90 A.L.R. 119 (1934).
The question of whether Nebraska's compensation act will apply
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Similarly, differences exist in the effect of an award in a common-
law personal injury action as compared to an award under a work-
man's compensation statute. Clearly, in the ordinary personal in-
jury case, once the extent of liability has been determined in a
court of competent jurisdiction the parties to that judgment are
where some elements of the employment occur in other states has
received considerable attention. See Notes, 3 NEB. L. BULL. 295 (1924);
12 NEB. L. BuLL. 275 (1932) ; 17 NEB. L. BULL. 386 (1938). The legislature
did anticipate application of the Nebraska act to some injuries occurring
outside the state, NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-186 (Reissue 1960); but did not
specifically provide when the act should apply to such injuries. Prior
to 1957, Nebraska's statute applied "to every employer in this state."
Neb. Laws 1945, ch. 111, § 1 at 356. The court utilized a test of whether
the injury was incident to industry being carried on in Nebraska. The
factors which the court has considered, in order of importance, are: the
employer's principal place of business, business headquarters or place
of residence, the state where the employment contract was entered into,
and the employee's place of residence. No distinction was made whether
the injury occurred in Nebraska or outside the state. However, if the
injury occurred in Nebraska, the court easily found that the employer
fell within the statutory definition, and the burden was then on the em-
ployer to prove the absence of Nebraska industry if application of the
Nebraska act was to be avoided. Solomon v. A. W. Farny, Inc., 130 Neb.
484, 265 N.W.724 (1936); Esau v. Smith Bros., 124 Neb. 217, 241 N.W.230(1933); Radford v. Smith Bros., 123 Neb. 13, 241 N.W. 753 (1932). Where
the injury occurred outside Nebraska, the court would apply the Ne-
braska act: McRae v. Ulrich, 147 Neb. 214, 22 N.W.2d 697 (1946) ; Penwell
v. Anderson, 125 Neb. 449, 250 N.W. 665 (1933); Stone v. Thompson, 124
Neb. 181, 245 N.W. 600 (1932); Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb.
698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930). However, the court was more hesitant to apply
Nebraska's act to out-of-state injuries, and the burden was upon the
employee to show that his injury was incident to Nebraska industry:
Rigg v. Atlantic, Pac. & Gulf Oil Co., 129 Neb. 412, 261 N.W. 900 (1935);
Watts v. Long, 116 Neb. 656, 218 N.W. 410 (1928).
In 1957, section 48-106 of the Nebraska statutes was amended and
became applicable "to every employer in this state, including non-
resident employers performing work in the State." Under the exist-
ing provision, where the injury occurs in Nebraska, apparently this
element alone is sufficient to cause the Nebraska act to apply. Rapp
v. Hale, 170 Neb. 620, 103 N.W.2d 815 (1960). The question still re-
mains whether the 1957 amendment changes the situation where the
injury occurs outside Nebraska. The purpose of the amendment is to
do away with any discrimination between resident and non-resident
employers. See LABOR AND PUBLIc WELFARE CoiV.nmrrTEE REPORT on L.B.
69, (January 16, 1957). Before Nebraska can apply its act, however, it
must have some substantial interest in allowing compensation. Thus,
it seems that in the future a distinction will have to be drawn between
in-state and out-state injuries. Where the injury occurs outside of
Nebraska, the factors of the employer's principal place of business or
residence, the state where the employment contract was entered into,
the residence of the employee and the location of the industry will con-
tinue to be important in determining whether the Nebraska act applies.
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bound both as to existence and to extent of liability.8 Furthermore,
the federal constitution requires that such proceedings be given
full faith and credit in every other state.9 In the workmen's compen-
sation area, however, the existence of an award in one state having
competent jurisdiction does not necessarily preclude a second state
from granting a higher award if credit is given to the employer
for amounts previously paid under the prior award.10 Many states
frequently allow such supplemental awards."
8 RESTATEMENT, JUDGEMENTS § 1 (1942); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §
206 (1949).
9 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 446 (1934);
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 208 (1949).
10 The early state rule was that supplemental awards were often granted
by the forum state after giving credit for the amount of payments pre-
viously made by the employer under another state's act. See RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 403 (1934); Annot., 101 A.L.R. 1445 (1936).
It then appeared that the Supreme Court would impose a constitutional
rule that full faith and credit had to be given in the later forum state
to a prior award of another state having jurisdiction: Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). However, four years later, the
Supreme Court restricted the Magnolia rule to its particular facts, and
allowed a state to give a supplemental recovery after giving credit to
payments made under the prior award. Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin,
330 U.S. 622 (1947). Although in McCartin the Court did not expressly
overrule Magnolia, many writers have interpreted this to be the prac-
tical effect. See Bowers v. American Bridge Co., 43 N.J. Super. 48, 64,
127 A.2d 580, 589 (App. Div. 1956), aff'd, 24 N.J. 390, 132 A.2d 28 (1957).
Several authorities are collected in 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW 360, n. 11 (1952). See also GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 292 (1949).
11 An attempt has been made to examine all the cases deciding this ques-
tion since McCartin was decided in 1947. The following cases specifically
held that a supplemental award could be made to the employee though
prior payments had been received under an award of another state.
None of these cases, however, imposed double liability on the employer.
Industrial Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 80 Cal. App. 2d 480,
182 P.2d 309 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1947); In re Lavorie, 334 Mass. 403, 135
N.E.2d 750 (1956); Cline v. Byrne Doors, 324 Mich. 540, 37 N.W.2d 630
(1949); Sorenson v. Standard Constr. Co., 238 Minn. 68, 55 N.W.2d 630
(1952); Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge Constr. Co., 231 Minn. 433, 43 N.W.2d
792 (1950); Hudson v. Kingston Contracting Co., 58 N.J. Super. 455, 156
A.2d 491 (Mercer County Ct. 1959); Bowers v. American Bridge Co., 43
N.J. Super. 48, 127 A.2d 580 (App. Div. 1956); Gehring v. Gehring Laces,
286 App. Div. 382, 143 N.Y.S.2d 17 (3d Dep't 1955); Gehring v. Notting-
ham Lace Works, Inc., 22 R.I. 190, 106 A.2d 923 (1954); Standard Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Skidmore, 222 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Spietz v.
Industrial Comm'n, 251 Wis. 168, 28 N.W.2d 354 (1947); cf. Buccheri v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 19 N.J. 594, 118 A.2d 21 (1955). Very few
cases decided since 1947 have been found in which the supplemental
award was not allowed. Gasch v. Britton, 202 F.2d 356 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
Bolton v. O'Conner, 114 F. Supp. 273 (S.D. Miss. 1953). Cases prior to
1947 are collected Annot., Award Under Workmen's Compensation Act
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Thus, assuming each state may weigh the conflicting policies
and choose the circumstances under which it will or will not apply
the provisions of its act where prior payments have been made
under another state's act, let us examine Nebraska's policy. The
Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act, like those of a majority
of other states, merely provides that its schedule of payments shall
control. It is silent as to whether receipt of prior payments made
under another state's act will affect the applicability of Nebraska's
act.'2 Apparently the legislature has either not anticipated the
problem or has left it for the courts to decide. The Nebraska
Supreme Court, however, has not yet decided these issues.13 In the
absence of specific statutory or court direction the compensation
court has established the following policies. First, the court has a
policy of taking jurisdiction and granting supplemental payments
under the Nebraska act even though the employee has received
prior payments under another state's act, if such payments have
been voluntary. 14 Of course, credit is given to the employer for
the amount of any prior payments.15 On the other hand, if the
as Bar to or Ground For Reduction of Claim Under Act of Another
State, 101 A.L.R. 1445 (1936); 150 A.L.R. 431 (1944); 169 A.L.R. 1185
(1947).
12 Section 48-109 provides that if both employee and employer are subject
to the Nebraska act, they are bound by its schedule of compensation.
Sections 48-136 and 48-140 provide that no settlement shall be binding
unless in accord with the provisions of the Nebraska act. There are a
few states which specifically provide by statute that the local compensa-
tion act will not apply if another state has awarded compensation though
the act will be applied in absence of a prior award. See 2 LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw 362 n.16 (1952).
13 The question of whether the employee was precluded from recovery
under Nebraska's act because of receipt of prior payments under the
Iowa act was presented in Rigg v. Atlantic, Pac. & Gulf Oil Co., 129 Neb.
412, 415, 261 N.W. 900, 902 (1935), but this case was decided on other
grounds. The question was specifically left undecided by the court and
the Nebraska court has not been called upon to decide this issue since
the Rigg case.
14 The word "voluntary", in the sense it is used here, must be taken to
mean voluntarily complying with a legal obligation. Judge Butzel, con-
curring in Cline v. Byrne Doors, 324 Mich. 540, 37 N.W.2d 630 (1949)
pointed out that it was doubtful that the employer ever makes the
payments voluntarily. He merely complied with the law which re-
quired him to make certain payments. These payments were only
voluntary in so far as they are made without a specific order and
formal proceedings before the compensation court.
15 All authorities agree that double liability should not be imposed upon
the employer. However, there is a diversity of views on the question
of whether there should ever be double recovery for an employee. Al-
though some authorities would permit supplemental awards to the
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prior payments have been received by reason of a lump sum set-
tlement or a prior award, the compensation court will not take
jurisdiction. 16 As to the compensation court's policy regarding the
effect of prior voluntary payments, the cases from other jurisdictions
are in accord with this result.17 The policy of refusing jurisdiction
in cases of a prior outstate award, however, is contrary to the
majority of cases deciding the question since 1947 when the
United States Supreme Court decided Industrial of Wis. v. McCar-
tin.'8 The Court held that Wisconsin could make a supplemental
award under its own compensation act although payments had been
received under a prior Illinois award.
III. THE NEBRASKA POSITION
The reasons given by the Nebraska compensation court for its
refusal to take jurisdiction are as follows:
(1) A contrary rule would allow the employee to "forum shop."
(2) The principles of res judicata should be applied to prevent re-
peated and prolonged litigation in order to allow the employer
to know when the employee's claim is fully satisfied.
(3) The principles of comity and full faith and credit should be
applied, recognizing and giving effect to the finality and ex-
maximum amount recoverable under any applicable statute, they argue
that no recovery should be allowed which exceeds the maximum single
award. See 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 470 (3d ed. 1941);
In re Mizarhi, 320 Mass. 733, 71 N.E.2d 383 (1947). On the other hand,
there is the view that the employee may have double recovery as long
as any single employer is not subjected to double liability. See Gehring
v. Nottingham Lace Works, 22 R.I. 190, 106 A.2d 923 (1954); Gehring v.
Gehring Laces, 286 App. Div. 382, 143 N.Y.S.2d 17 (3d Dep't 1955). See
also NEB REV. STAT. § 48-130 (Reissue 1960) which provides ". . . nor
shall benefits derived from any other source than those paid or caused
to be paid by the employer as herein provided, be considered in fixing
compensation under this act." See also Lincoln v. Steffensmeyer, 134
Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272 (1938) (employee allowed to recover both fire-
man's pension and workmen's compensation).
16 These policies were orally expressed to the writer by judges of the
Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court in a personal interview,
August 1961.
17 Although the question has not often been litigated, all the decided
cases on this point are to the effect that voluntary payments made
under one state's act will not bar claims subsequently made under the
compensation act of another state. Franklin v. Geo. P. Livermore, Inc.,
58 N.M. 349, 270 P.2d 983 (1954). The other cases are collected in Annot.,
8 A.L.R.2d 628 (1949).
18 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
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clusiveness which the first state gives to the prior proceedings
within its own borders.
(4) The employee has elected to recover under the prior state's
act, and he has waived his rights under Nebraska's act.
(5) The compensation court has not received any directions from
either the compensation act or the Nebraska Supreme Court
contrary to the present policy.
On the other hand, those who advocate a result contrary to that
applied by our compensation court present the following arguments:
(1) There is-no constitutional requirement that Nebraska always
give the-same effect of finality to the first award as the other
state gives within its own borders. 19
(2) Nebraska may have substantial and important interests of its
own in compensating the employee to the full extent provided
by its act because the injured employee or his dependents may
become a burden on Nebraska taxpayers, or Nebraska citizens
may have debts due arising from medical care of the injured
employee.20
(3) Sufficient faith and credit is given to the prior award, and no
double liability is imposed on the employer since full credit is
given for any prior payments paid by the employer.21
(4) The res judicata principles of bar and merger applicable in
ordinary transitory personal injury actions should not be uni-
formly applied to the separate causes of action created and
limited by the different local compensation acts of two separate
states.
22
(5) The employer cannot complain when he is only held to his
statutory duty, since one who conducts business in more than
19 Bowers v. American Bridge Co., 43 N.J. Super. 48, 64, 127 A.2d 580, 589(App. Div. 1956); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit
to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 177 (1949); see note 10 supra.
20 2 LARSON, Wom WEN's COMPENSATION LAW 365 (1952); Note, 23 MIn.
L. REV. 866, 868 (1939).
21 HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WoRmvmENs COMPENSATION LAWS
42 (1944); Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge Constr. Co., 231 Minn. 433,
443, 43 N.W.2d 792, 798 (1950).
22 Ogino v.Black, 278 App. Div. 146,150,104 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (1st Dep't 1951);
Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 44 COLUM.
L. REV. 330, 344 (1944); Spietz v. Industrial Comm'n, 251 Wis. 168, 179,
28 N.W.2d 354, 359 (1947); Cline v. Byrne Doors, 324 Mich. 540, 549,
37 N.W.2d 630, 634 (1949).
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one state must comply with the multi-state legal requirements
that result.
23
(6) Frequently the employer is in an advantageous economic or
legal position compared to the employee, and can control which
state will take jurisdiction in the first proceeding. In the first
instance, the employee may not be represented by counsel, he
may be hospitalized, he may not know he can recover higher
compensation in the second state, or he may not have the finan-
cial resources required to proceed in the other state.
24
Furthermore, it seems that the policy as presently applied by
our compensation court tends to defeat an important purpose of
the workmen's compensation acts. One purpose of these acts is
to provide prompt limited payments of income and medical ex-
penses to the employee during his time of greatest need. Thus, the
employer who willingly complies with his statutory duty should be
encouraged. Under the present policy, however, the recalcitrant em-
ployer is favored. The compensation court will take jurisdiction
and frequently award supplemental payments under Nebraska's act
if prior payments have been voluntarily made; but it refuses to
take jurisdiction where the employer makes payments only under
an award.
IV. CONCLUSION
The issue is open in Nebraska, and one may ask the following
question: How should the Nebraska Supreme Court, if called upon,
decide the question of whether jurisdiction under Nebraska's com-
pensation act is affected by prior payments made under an award
of another state?
In light of the authorities, the reasonableness of a rule which
distinguishes between taking jurisdiction where payments are made
voluntarily, and not taking jurisdiction where payments are made
under an award of another state is questionable. Although such a
rule may claim the virtue of certainty, an attempt should be made
to formulate a rule which more clearly accomplishes the purposes
of the act and lacks the arbitrary features of such a distinction. The
compensation court should accept jurisdiction in all cases covered by
the Nebraska compensation act, whether or not there have been prior
23 Walkin, Workmen's Compensation Award-Commonplace or Anomality
in Full Faith and Credit Pattern, 92 U. OF PA. L. REV. 401, 410 (1944).
24 2 LARSON, WoRumEN's COMPENSATION LAW 365 (1952); HoRovrrz, INJURY
AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 41 (1944); Bowers
v. American Bridge Co., 43 N.J. Super. 48, 127 A.2d 580 (App. Div. 1956).
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outstate proceedings. This rule requires elimination of the existing
practice which flatly rejects taking jurisdiction in every case where
a prior outstate award exists. Such a rule, however, would not neces-
sarily result in additional compensation being awarded under the
Nebraska act. If it appears that the employee is attempting to re-
cover more than the maximum compensation allowed by either
state, compensation under the Nebraska act should not be awarded.
Where there is a reasonable explanation why the proceedings were
not first undertaken in Nebraska, or where Nebraska's interests will
be best served by allowing compensation, the employee or his de-
pendents should be awarded the full compensation authorized by
the Nebraska act. The same result should also follow where claims
which relate to the injury are held by Nebraska citizens, or where
the injured employee or his dependents may otherwise burden
Nebraska taxpayers.
The Nebraska legislature has provided that the Nebraska Com-
pensation Court has jurisdiction solely to apply the provisions of
the Nebraska compensation act.2 The Nebraska legislature has
provided that where the injury comes within the coverage of the
Nebraska act, compensation shall be made according to the schedule
provided in the Nebraska act.26 Certainly, where the Nebraska act
covers the injury (and since Nebraska citizens must bear the burden
of caring for their injured) the schedule of compensation payments
provided by the legislature should be controlling. The compensation
schedule established by the legislature of some remote state should
not bind the parties to compensation proceedings in Nebraska. The
Nebraska legislature has allocated the cost of compensating for em-
ployment injuries between the tax moneys and the cost of doing
business. Thus, the Nebraska compensation schedule should control
where Nebraska interests require.
Certainly, the full faith and credit provision of the federal
constitution does not distinguish between another state's statutes
as compared with judicial proceedings under those statutes. -2 7 The
United States Supreme Court has held that, if there are sufficient
minimal contacts with the employment relationship, a second state
may apply its local compensation act and is not bound by another
state's statute or prior award. Thus it seems clear that Nebraska
could, if it so desired, apply its own compensation schedule not-
withstanding the existence of an award in another state.
25 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-152 (Reissue 1960).
26 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-110 to 48-121 (Reissue 1960).
27 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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Under the existing choice of law rules, it is true an employee
may have his choice of forum.28 No serious problem, however, is
created by an award under a second state's compensation act. A
second state, to apply its act, must have legislative jurisdiction, viz.,
certain minimum contacts with the employment relationship, so
that in every case the second state would have taken jurisdiction if
the action had been brought there in the first instance.29 Thus,
where credit is given for amounts paid under a prior award, the
payments will not be greater by reason of a second award than if
the employee had originally brought his claim in the jurisdiction
most favorable to him.
Authorities have pointed out that, to some extent, different
causes of action are involved in compensation proceedings in two
separate states. Recovery is limited in scope and amount to the
provisions of the particular local statute of the jurisdiction. In re-
turn the employee must generally forego other methods of com-
pensation in that jurisdiction.30 However, if he later proceeds under
a second state's act, on a different local cause of action, it is said
that res judicata does not bar a higher award under the second
state action.31 Compensation causes may be distinguished from the
ordinary negligence case because, in the latter case, the plaintiff
may sue the defendant and have his entire cause of action conclu-
sively adjudicated in any jurisdiction where the defendant may
be found. Furthermore, in tort actions the courts frequently apply
another state's internal law when the state taking jurisdiction does
not have substantial contacts with the substantive issue being de-
cided. Generally, this does not occur in workmen's compensation
cases. Nearly always the court which takes jurisdiction is bound
by substantive rules of its own local law. In compensation cases
where there are not sufficient contacts to justify application of
the local act, the court will not take jurisdiction.32
When an employee has received payments under a compensa-
tion award, it is sometimes stated that he has impliedly waived his
rights to proceed under a second state's act, or that he has impliedly
elected to recover only under the prior act. It should be recognized,
however, that such statements do not express reasons why the
second state should not take jurisdiction. Statements of implied
28 Horovitz, op. cit. supra note 24, at 39.
29 See, e.g., Spietz v. Industrial Comm'n, 251 Wis. 168, 28 N.W.2d 354 (1947).
30 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-111 (Reissue 1960).
31 See note 22 supra.
32 See notes 5 and 6 supra.
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waiver or election are only another way of stating a result. They
do not help decide which result is most desirable. Rather than
speaking in terms of implied elections and waivers, our attention
should be directed to factors such as the policy of the compensation
act, the fairness to the parties, the certainty and the sensibleness
of the rule.
It is clear that it is not unfair to employers to eliminate present
practice distinguishing between voluntary payments and payments
made under an award of another state. The fact that the employer
is subject to another state's compensation act as well as Nebraska's
act does not eliminate the requirement of complying with Ne-
braska's act. Although the employer is subject to more than one
compensation act, he can know when his liability is extinguished.
He is held responsible only to the highest compensation schedule
of those few states which have sufficient minimal contacts to take
jurisdiction and apply their schedule to the particular injury. In
fact, it may be said that not to hold an employer fully accountable
under the Nebraska act merely because of existence of a prior
award results in unwarranted discrimination between employers.
Frequently, in these situations an employer can start the compensa-
tion proceedings, or control which state will take jurisdiction in the
first instance. Yet other employers otherwise having identical
employment activities operating only in Nebraska, or employers
who make voluntary payments, are held subject to the full re-
quirements of the Nebraska act. Furthermore, if Nebraska were
to eliminate the distinction presently followed and take jurisdiction
when its act is otherwise applicable regardless of whether there
has been a prior award, the result will be in harmony with the
decisions of every other state court which has decided this ques-
tion throughout the past fifteen years.33
33 See note 11 supra.
